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This paper explores the concept of agricultural resilience in the context of climate change related 
water scarcity.  Specifically, the impact of water scarcity on agricultural production is analyzed 
to  derive  the  timing  of  exit  decisions  for  farmers  faced  with  the  prospect  of  declining 
profitability in agriculture but increasing benefits from land rezoning in future.  The prospects of 
land rezoning are modeled as a poison process which may or may not be influenced by farmer’s 
water abstraction decisions.  Selling out of agriculture before land rezoning has an impatience 
cost as the farmer does not gain the maximum speculative rewards.  The analysis highlights the 
role  of  such  speculative  rewards  in  making  farmers  resilient  to  declining  profitability  in 
agriculture  and  also  identifies  the  circumstances  under  which  the  water  prices  may  be  an 
ineffective policy tool for allocating water.  An empirical application is performed using the 
above model for the case of a drought prone region in Western Australia. 
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1.  Introduction 
Climate  change  related  water  scarcity  is  increasingly  becoming  a  harsh  reality  for  many 
countries.   While water has several competing uses, agriculture has been the main beneficiary of 
water recourses historically.  Increasing frequency of droughts, however, has forced water usage 
restrictions on farmers, thereby imposing declining profitability in agriculture.  Yet, farmers have 
been found to be resilient to such climatic impacts (Keil et al. 2007).    
Several  theories  have  been  proposed  to  explain  farming  decisions  under  external 
pressures.  Farmers' timing of entry and exit decisions has received considerable attention in the 
agricultural economics literature. Previous literatures have found links of exit decisions with 
farm characteristics, farmer's age (specifically retirement and pre-retirement decisions) and the 
existence of potential successors (see e.g. Kimhi 1994; Pietola et al. 2003).   
Urbanization pressure has been studied as well.  For farmers to survive rapidly rising land 
value from urbanization, two recommendations have been made by Adelaja et al. (1998). First, 
farmers must switch to high value crops that yield more profitability (e.g, ornamentals, herbals 
and  vegetables).  Second,  institutional  changes  are  necessary  so  as  to  protect  farmers  via 
mechanisms such as farm land preservation or right-to-farm acts. 
Declining  profitability  within  agriculture  has  caused  farmers  to  take  to  speculative 
measures.    Speculative  effects  and  reliance  of  farmers  on  capital  gains  from  farmland  sales 
compromises the long-term competitiveness of farms as farmers are reluctant to invest in new 
technology, or so called "impermanence syndrome"(Lockeretz, 1989). With prospects of selling 
farm lands to urban developers, farmers perceive their lands as a financial asset instead of a   4 
productive input (Lopez et al., 1988) and prefer to operate at sub-optimal efficiency and wait-it-
out until land is rezoned to urbanization. 
There exists an extensive literature devoted to understanding the linkages between land 
speculation from urbanization in the rural areas on efficient farming practices (see e.g. Raup, 
1975;  Plaut  1980;  Lopez  et  al.,  1988;  Lockeretz,  1986,  1988,  1989;  Lockeretz  et  al.  1987). 
Kottke (1966) explains the linkages that farm business life cycle and urbanization have on timing 
of exit decision.  However, to the authors' knowledge, none have formally linked urbanization 
pressure coupled with water scarcity to exit decisions. 
The contribution of this paper is therefore to model the timing of farmers' exit decisions 
under pressure from urbanization and water scarcity in the context of depleting groundwater 
resources due to climate change.  This paper models the farmer’s decision as a binary choice 
problem where the farmer is forced to consider the timing of making an exit out of agriculture 
due to either declining profitability or higher rewards from land rezoning, from rural into urban 
areas.  As long as the farmer decides to stay on in agriculture he optimizes over the use of water 
and other resources in order to reap maximum possible benefits from agriculture.  The farmer’s 
use of water resources may or may not have an influence over the possibility and timing of land 
rezoning.  For instance, if water has more important competing uses (such as urban demand or 
environmental requirements), the government may decide to rezone earlier if the rate of water 
drawdown  in  agriculture  is  significant.    When  the  farmer(s)  can  collectively  influence  (say 
through a manager of an irrigation district) such rezoning possibilities, inefficient uses of water, 
even though costly, might be promoted due to their impact on rezoning possibilities.  Whether or 
not the possibilities of land rezoning are endogenized, the farmer has the option of selling land 
out of agriculture to another farmer or a speculative urban developer.  However, this option leads   5 
to a lower reward than the reward from waiting until the land has been rezoned.  The timing of 
exit is determined by the intersection of the value function from staying on in agriculture (which 
involves profits from agriculture and expected rewards from rezoning) and the one-off reward 
from selling out of agriculture.   
  Our  findings  highlight  the  role  of  speculative  impact  from  rezoning  in  highlighting 
farmer resilience in the presence of increasing water scarcity.  The model is applied to the case of 
a water challenged region in Western Australia, the city of Perth.  The empirical analysis also 
reveals  that  because  the  benefits  from  urban  are  so  large,  use  of  water  prices  as  a  tool  for 
allocating scarce water resources may not be an effective policy tool when risk of rezoning is 
endogenous.   
1.2.  Model  
Understanding resilience in agriculture is significant for policy purposes. Resilience has been 
traditionally defined in two senses; one called the engineering definition refers to the rate at 
which a system can revert back to its original state after an initial perturbation (Pimm1984); the 
other called ecological resilience refers to the amount of shock that any system can withstand 
before flipping into a new state (Holing and Meffe 1996).  Economic resilience for agriculture 
can be defined as the amount of water shortage related economic loss that it can tolerate before 
either relocating or shutting down.  Alternatively, it could also be measured in terms of the 
maximum amount of reduction in water supply that leaves the farming profits unaltered.  This, of 
course, would require farmers to adapt to new water saving technologies.  If farmers undergo 
losses,  and  yet  do  not  alter  farming  practices  or  are  not  willing  to  relocate,  then  this  could 
possibly be due to behavioral resilience borne out of psychological, social or speculative factors.    6 
In this paper we use the term resilience to identify farmer’s persistence in agriculture despite 
water restrictions and declining possibilities. 
Let the output in agriculture be defined by the following production function: 
(1)  q - q = 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( t k t Ah t q  
where  ) (t q is the output or yield at time t,  Ais an exogenous technology parameter,  ) (t h  is water 
abstraction,  ) (t k is the use of other factors such as capital, land and labor, and q  is the share of 
water in output.   
While agriculture may use both surface and groundwater, here we assume that only groundwater 
is available for farming.  Let the long term water supply to agriculture be modeled as: 
(2)  ) ( )) ( ( ) ( t h t rain t w - + - = b a &
 
where α is the long term rate of decline of water table due to climate change, β is the amount that 
gets recharged through rainfall (rain),  ) (t h  is the annual harvest or water abstraction rate and
 
) (t w  is the total stock of water.   
Consider that the farmer maximizes long term discounted net benefits from agriculture as: 
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Where  p  is the price of agricultural commodity,  chis cost of harvest parameter (e.g. pumping 
costs),  g & ck are cost of capital parameters,  0 w is the initial level of water table and r is the rate 
of discount.  We ignore the time argument for simplicity of presentation.  Farming decisions also 
involve long term planning in terms profitability out side of agriculture.  There is an element of   7 
uncertainty in terms of future land use allocations. Hence, even though water scarcity increases, 
there is an expectation that future profits from higher land prices might balance current losses.  
To model this we assume that the possibility of land rezoning is given by a hazard rate  )) ( ( t w z&  
of land conversion which is a function of the level of water in the mound.  The methodology 
used for modeling the risk of rezoning in this model is based on previous works of Clarke and 
Reed (1994), and Tsur and Zemel (2004).  The risk of rezoning is modeled using a survival 
function to represent the farmer’s likelihood of surviving conversion into each time period, t. Let 
T  be  the  moment  of  conversion.  The  cumulative  probability  distribution  associated  with 
conversion  is  denoted  F(t),  where  ). Pr( ) ( t T t F < =   The  survival  function  captures  the 
probability that conversion has not yet occurred in time t, and represents the upper tail of the 
cumulative probability distribution:  
(4)  ) ( 1 ) Pr( ) ( t F t T t S - = ³ = .  
In each time period it is assumed that, conditional upon arriving in time t without yet 
having  been  converted,  the  system  faces  a  certain  probability  of  transition  into  the  post-
conversion  state,  denoted ) (t z& .  This  conditional  probability,  ) (t z& ,  is  also  referred  to  as  the 
hazard rate. 
The idea is that as the groundwater level drops, government would be forced to relocate 
agricultural  farmers  into  some  other  areas.  This  would  mean  land  resale  and  possible 
urbanization of the existing agricultural area, thus leading to very high profits from land sales.  
When this happens, the value function to the farmers is a one-time benefit that accrues at the 
time of sale.  The revised objective function can now be derived as:   8 
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where N is the speculative gain from selling their land.  The objective function is maximized 
subject to constraints (1) and (2) and the equation of motion for the hazard rate, which is given 
as: 
(6)  h J = z &  
The  hazard  rate  of  conversion  is  a  function  of  the  amount  of  water  abstracted  by  the 
representative farmer in each period (which translates into net impact on the water table over 
time), thus making the risk of rezoning endogenous.  In reality, the risk of rezoning may be 
exogenous and we consider such situations later on.  The current value Hamiltonian is given as: 
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where  1 g is  the  shadow  price  of  water    and  2 g is  the  shadow  price  of  cumulative  risk  of 
conversion.  The first order condition with respect to water harvest implies: 
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No-arbitrage condition for the shadow price of water implies: 
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No-arbitrage condition for the shadow price of risk implies: 
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In steady state, we get from equation (11):   9 
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Steady state for equation (10) implies: 
(13)  1










Equation (12) dictates that optimal shadow price of risk from rezoning must equal the discounted 
net  sum  of  per  period  expected  benefits  arising  out  of  staying  in  agriculture  or  rezoning.  
Equation  (13)  dictates  that  the  shadow  price  of  water  must  equal  the  discounted  value  of 
increased  costs  of  abstraction  from  drawing  an  additional  unit  of  water  out  of  the  ground.  
Equations (9)-(11) lay out an optimal water harvesting plan for the farmer when faced with land 
rezoning possibilities.  However, so far, we have only considered the tradeoffs between farming 
and  speculative  benefits  from  urbanization  which  the  farmer  may  or  may  not  be  able  to 
influence.  But, the farmer also has the option of moving out of agriculture and selling off his 
land to another speculative buyer at a lower price than what he would have received had the land 
been rezoned.  We extend this binary choice of exit or not exit in the next section.   
 
1.3. Exit Timing under Endogenous and Exogenous Rezoning Risks: A Binary Choice 
Extension 
The revised objective function can now be derived as: 





- ∫ + - N + -
0
} ) ( { )) ( 1 }( {
x z& ,   10
where  ) (t sell is 1 when the land is sold and 0 otherwise,  w p  is the price of water  imposed by 
the policy maker  pq  is gross profit from production function in (14),  a N is the gain from selling 
land after rezoning and  b N is the speculative gain from selling land before rezoning.   
The above formulation allows for exiting out agriculture even as  b N < a N .  Once the 
farmer decides to exit out of agriculture he derives a one-off reward  b N and the game is over.  
We apply the above model to the Gnangara Mound case, an agricultural region located on top of 
deep aquifer in the city of Perth in Western Australia.  The aquifer was regarded as an infinite 
resource in the past. Climate change has caused its water table to decline over time, thereby 
creating conflicts between the competing uses of its water that span, urban, environmental and 
agricultural uses.  In section 2.1 below we provide some more context to the region and its 
problems and then apply the above model to evaluate farming resilience and policy options. 
2.1.  The Gnangara Mound 
The Gnangara Mound is a system of four loosely connected aquifers located beneath the Swan 
Coastal plane in Western Australia. It is the most valuable source of fresh water in the Perth 
Region as it provides the majority of water used for consumptive purposes in the urban area and 
supports the agricultural and commercial sector. The ongoing decline in recharge of groundwater 
through reduced rainfall from climate change and unsustainable abstraction have led to concerns 
that groundwater under the Gnangara Mound is no longer a boundless source of water. Water 
scarcity could have significant impact on the viability of agriculture and other water dependent 
sectors. Optimal allocation of water between different sectors might require curtailing of water to 
certain sectors, particularly those with lower  economic benefit from each megalitre (ML) of 
water consumed.    11
The horticulture sector on the Gnangara Mound is the second largest user of water under 
the mound. There is a current license to abstract 66 gigalitres of water a year or 19 percent of 
total abstraction (Marsden Jacob Associates, 2006)
i. Although horticulture is a significant social 
and economic activity, under the current lower than average rainfall conditions and declining 
watertable  levels,  there  is  little  prospect  of  new  water  licences  and  allocations  being  made 
available to enable new horticultural uses and land to be irrigated or for existing uses to expand 
(DPI, 2005). The timing of such curtailment becomes a crucial policy issue as it could determine 
whether or not adequate adaptation opportunities are provided to the affected sectors.  Another 
related  issue  is  the  efficacy  of  such  public  policies.    There  might  be  significant  resistance 
towards them which could lead to delays or inefficient uses of scarce resource if they are not 
adequately allocated through a market mechanism that reflects their scarcity value.  
2.2.   Empirical Application 
We apply here in our model the Wanneroo horticultural precinct on the Gnagara Mound, which 
is located approximately 50 kilometres north of the city centre. The precinct has been eyed for 
urban development as it is strategically located close to the city and a major road (Wanneroo 
road) connecting the precinct and the city already exists. As Perth is experiencing exponential 
growth  in  demand  for  housing  due  to  the  mining  boom,  there  is  increasing  interest  to 
landbanking  and  speculation  by  property  developers,  investors  and  farmers  reaching  their 
retirement. This has contributed to non-productive use of existing rural zoned land for agriculture 
as farmers await for their lands to be rezoned for urban purposes. 
To run empirical simulations, data on climate change impact and agricultural production 
function  for  vegetables  in  the  Wanneroo  horticultural  precinct  was  required.  The  variety  of   12
vegetables crops grown in the Wanneroo horticultural precinct generally varies from year to year 
depending on market demand. In this report, due to data availability, an empirical analysis of the 
economics  of  lettuce  production  grown  using  sprinkler  systems  was  used.  Data  on  lettuce 
production function was based on Brennan (2007) where a plateauing yield function with respect 
to harvested water (for irrigation) was specified as  
(15)  2 ) ( 1 )) ( (
0 )) ( ( ) ( t nh m j ie e g b k q t h a t ch a - + - - = - + -  
Parameters and variable values in equation (15) are reported in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. 
Data  on  recorded  actual  groundwater  table  from  early  1970s  to  2005  and  predicted 
groundwater table simulated in the Perth Regional Aquifer Modeling System (PRAMS) from 
2005  to  2030  was  taken  from  the  State  of  the  Gnangara  Mound  Report  (DOW,  2005).  A 
represented area of the Wanneroo horticulture precinct (See Figure 2 area JP9) was chosen along 
with  an  eight  year  climate  change  scenario  where  the  impact  of  climate  change  on  the 
groundwater table is most severe.  It was decided that an eight  year climate change scenario 
would be most appropriate for calibrating the hazard rate as it represents the worst possible case. 
Figure 1 shows data points simulated by PRAMS of falling water table with time due to severe 
climate change impact. The lines show a fit of the data points which can be represented by the 
functional form: 
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where 0.1 is the conversion parameter from volume (ML) to water table height (metres). In the 
exogenous risk case it is assumed that the risk of rezoning is a function of the declining water 
table with time, due to the impact of climate change, and the increased risk is independent of   13
water harvesting by the farmers.   The endogenous risk case includes farmers’ harvest of water 
for agricultural production into the risk component as well. The survival probability, based on 
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Where  0 p  is the exogenous component of the hazard rate and is used as a scaling factor for 
numerical simulations.  While it is more likely that risk of rezoning is affected by the aggregate 
water  abstraction  of  all  farmers  rather  than  a  single  farmer’s  abstraction,  here  we  make  the 
assumption  that  an  individual  farmer  is  a  representative  of  an  aggregate  farmer  acting  on  a 
smaller scale.  Consequently, he is aware of the total impact of all individual abstractions on the 
risks. 
 Expected gain from selling land after rezoning is based on current and projected land value of 
urban land on Gnangara Mound. The median sales price in 2007 for the Wanneroo district was 
approximately $3million/ha (REIWA, 2007). Expected gain before rezoning was approximated 
at half of that. Specifications from  a N  and  b N are in Appendix II.  
A  Mixed  Integer  Non-linear  Programming  solver  in  GAMS  was  used  to  incorporate  both 
continuous and binary choice controls for optimization of the above problem.  We also use a 200 
period time horizon to mimic a continuously lived farmer.    
 
3.  Results   14
We perform several numerical simulations varying the exogenous component of the hazard rate 
(given by  0 p ).  A change in this parameter alters the risk of rezoning thereby changing the 
expected rewards from rezoning.  We define the discounted sum of agricultural benefits and the 
expected rewards from rezoning as ‘beforesell’ reward and the discounted sum of one-off reward 
from selling out of agriculture before rezoning as ‘aftersell’ reward.  Figure 4 compares the 
beforesell and aftersell rewards for various values of  0 p .  Note that beforesell reward is highest 
when  0 p  is the highest and lowest when  0 p  is the lowest.  This should be intuitive as an increase 
in the overall chances of rezoning increases the expected rewards.  Also, note that the beforesell 
reward has a concave shape which is a result of two forces-the rising land prices pushing it 
upwards and the declining probability of land rezoning over time pushing it downwards.  The 
probability of rezoning falls over time as the cumulative probability increases with time, thus 
making conversion far away in future less likely than earlier.  The probability effect dominates 
the land price effect over time thus giving it the concave shape.  Aftersell rewards are depicted as 
single point dashes in the same figure.  The later the exit of the farmer, the lower is the reward 
from selling land.  This is primarily guided by the time discounting effect.  First result to note is 
that exit happens earlier if  0 p  is lower (as given by  0 p  =0.5).  When the chances of urbanization 
are slim, it is more profitable to move out of agriculture earlier, as there is no point in waiting for 
rezoning to happen.  Also note that the reward from selling out agriculture is higher the sooner 
the farmer sells off.  While most of the cases depicted in Figure 4 are with exogenous rezoning 
chances, we also consider one possibility (case with  0 p =1, pw=0) where the farmer is able to 
influence  the  chances  of  rezoning  by  his  choice  of  water  usage.    The  logic  behind  this 
assumption is that, even though it may not be possible for a single farmer to have any significant 
impact on the overall water table on the Gnanagara Mound, he could still lower the water table   15
underneath  his  bore.    If,  all  farmers  have  similar  incentives,  the  risks  of  rezoning  could  be 
collectively influenced.  Notice that the beforesell rewards in this endogenous case are similar to 
the exogenous case when  0 p  =2.  This is primarily achieved through a very high level of water 
abstraction  in  the  endogenous  case.    Figure  5  compares  water  abstraction  levels  for  the 
exogenous  case  ( 0 p   =2)  and  the  endogenous  case  ( 0 p =1).    Traditionally  water  has  been 
available  to  farmers  at  a  negligible  cost
ii.    This  is  basically  a  case  of  subsidizing  water  for 
farming.    A  declining  yield  function  in  water  discourages  wasteful  excessive  uses  into 
agriculture.  However, our previous exercise shows that wasteful uses are still possible under 
perverse incentive from rezoning.   
Another purpose of this exercise is to evaluate the effectiveness of market instruments as 
water prices in alleviating water scarcity. In the next exercise we ask, what would happen if 
water prices are raised significantly?  Figure 6 compares the case of endogenous risk of rezoning 
with two water price (pw) levels-pw=0 and pw=50 (or equivalent to 50 cents per ML).  In fact, 
we hardly find any differences in the rate of water drawdown.  This is simply because the net 
benefits  from  agriculture  are  (including  higher  cost  of  water)  are  negligible  as  compared  to 
speculative rewards from rezoning.  Figure 6 shows the differential in the agriculture benefit 
function for the two cases.  In order to see how the different cases have an impact on the timing 
of land rezoning, consider figure 7.  The earliest chances of rezoning are achieved through case 
0 p =2 whereas the endogenous chances lie in the middle.   
 
4.   Conclusion   16
In this paper our key objective was to explore the factors and circumstances that may 
provide behavioral  resilience to farming from  climate change related  water scarcity.   It  was 
determined  that  when  risks  are  endogenous,  water  resources  are  highly  discounted  in  the 
presence of speculative benefits from land rezoning. When risks are exogenous, the timing of 
exit from agriculture is influenced by the level of the risk of rezoning—the higher the risk the 
more beneficial it is to wait out.  This provides for higher resilience under declining agricultural 
profits.  Water pricing may not be an efficacious tool for allocating water to their most valued 
usage  under  excessive  rewards  from  urbanization.  A  better  policy  instrument  for  preventing 
wasteful usage could be to put a cap on allowable abstraction, or water allocation limits.  
While the above analysis considers only economic factors that influence exit decisions in 
agriculture,  it  does  not  incorporate  social  factors  such  as  farmer's  age  and  education  and 
psychological factors such as risk aversion and risk weighting.  These factors also may have a 
significant influence on farming decisions.  Old generation farmers are less likely to move out of 
agriculture due to lifestyle choices compared to the younger generation.  Education level may 
influence acceptance and adoption of new water saving technologies.  Risk weighting has been 
found to be significant in influencing investment and speculative actions.  Farmer heterogeneity 
may be crucial in determining resilience to droughts for a particular region as large farmers may 
be better able to sustain climate change related or policy shocks compared to small farmers.  
Inter-sectoral dynamics within the agricultural sector could also determine the level of farmer 
heterogeneity.  Large farmers may buy out small farmers as the size of their holding may have an 
impact on the magnitude of their rewards from rezoning.   
In  a  policy  context,  a  long  term  approach  to  agricultural  planning  is  needed  to  help 
maintain the economic viability of the agriculture sector under the increasing pressure from other   17
land uses such as urbanization. Adequate protection of the agricultural sector through appropriate 
land rezoning discourages land speculation and subdivision of land by farmers just prior to their 
retirement. It will also encourage farmers that choose to stay in business to adopt more efficient 
farming practices and water saving technologies.   18
                                                           
i The integrated water supply system (IWSS) which provides potable water consumption to Perth metropolitan is the largest water user on the 
mound. The current abstraction is 344 gigalitres/year or 48% of total abstraction. 
ii Farmers currently pay only for the cost of abstraction such as the cost of sinking a bore and the cost of electricity. It has been estimated that 
abstraction costs is $50/ML or 5 cents per kilolitre (Brennan, 2007). 
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Appendix I 
Table 1: Agricultural Production Function and Water Table Projection 
Production Function (Equation 15)  Water Table Function (Equation 16) 
a=-1.7  w1=3 
a1=-.065  w2=49000 
b=27000  Η=11.7 
c=1.56   
g=.305   
i=4500   
j=11.8   
m=18.8   
n=1.4   
 
Appendix II 
Land price specifications 
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Figure 1: Projected Water Table Decline with Time (where t=1=1980) 
Water table height (metres)   25
  
 
Figure 2: Gnangara Mound predictive hydrograph locations (source: DOE, 2005)   26
 
 













































































































Figure 6: Agricultural Benefits under Exogenous and Endogenous cases 































Figure 7:  Probability that land will survive rezoning until time t 
 
 
 
 
 
 